

PAGES _____

DATE _____

Box _____

Folder # _____

Fon # _____

BEST COPY

AVAILABLE

~~TOP SECRET~~

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

J-19-d

Copy 33

(THIS IS AN APPROVED PLAN)

25X1A2G

EMERGENCY PLAN

BREAK-OFF OF KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

18 September 1951

(THIS IS AN APPROVED PLAN)

TOP SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

J-19-4

	<u>Page</u>
I INTRODUCTION	1
II PROBLEM	1
III SITUATION	1
IV PRECISITS FOR PLANNING	1
V ASSUMPTIONS	2
VI CONTINGENCIES TO BE CONSIDERED	2
VII DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM	3
VIII PREPARATIONS IN BEING FOR BREAKDOWN OF ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS	11
IX PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS RECOMMENDED	12
X PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION	13

ANNEX (A) INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (SECRET)

ANNEX (B) PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE (CONFIDENTIAL)

ANNEX (C) PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE (CONFIDENTIAL)

ANNEX (D) PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE (CONFIDENTIAL)

ANNEX (E) PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE (CONFIDENTIAL)

ANNEX (F) PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE (CONFIDENTIAL)

ANNEX (G) ADDITIONAL COURSES OF ACTION (TOP SECRET - NEED TO KNOW)

TOP SECRET

J-19-d

(URGENT!)

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD ^{25X1A2G}

EMERGENCY PLAN [REDACTED]

BREAKOFF OF KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

I

INTRODUCTION

This plan endeavors to establish, for governmental departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations, courses of action for application in preparation for and in the event of a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations.

II

PROBLEM

To develop psychological courses of action to be pursued in preparation for and in the event of breakoff of Korean armistice negotiations.

III

SITUATION

1. Should the present Korean armistice talks fail, the danger of general war will be increased.
2. A period of alarm and spiritual depression will accompany the breakoff of negotiations and during this period the peoples of the world will be psychologically vulnerable.
3. It is imperative that we stand ready to wrest from Communism, during this period of psychological vulnerability, the initiative in psychological matters.

IV

PRECEPTS FOR PLANNING

1. On the principle that sound psychological operations are not independent operations but operations in support of political, economic, and military action.

TOP SECRET

J-19-d

and with the purpose of achieving U. S. initiative in the current psychological struggle with the Soviet Union, the following planning precepts are established:

- a. The policies, attitudes, and actions of the United Nations (as they reflect those of the United States) with respect to the initiation, conduct, and termination of the negotiations shall be put forcefully before the world;
- b. Communist propaganda and agitation with respect to the issues involved shall be vigorously undercut;
- c. Psychological planning shall be directed toward the end of achieving marked intensification of anti-Communist attitudes, actions, and capabilities of the free world;
- d. Psychological action shall be thoroughly integrated with United Nations political, economic, and military policy (as it reflects United States political, economic, and military policy).

V

ASSUMPTIONS

1. That the United States continues to act within the framework of UN authorization and seeks constantly to maintain and strengthen UN support for U. S. political, economic, and military policies and actions following breakdown of negotiations.
2. That, as sequel to breakdown of negotiations, military operations in Korea, entering into a new phase, may take on greater scope.

. VI

CONTINGENCIES TO BE CONSIDERED

In approaching the problem, three possible contingencies must be considered:

CONTINGENCY I

- a. There is a definitive end to negotiations;
- b. The Communists launch a mass offensive against UN forces including massive air attacks or submarine action against UN ground, air or naval forces.

TOP SECRET

CONTINGENCY II

1-19-4

- a. There is a definite end to negotiations;
- b. The Communists launch a massive ground offensive against UN forces;
- c. The enemy does not initiate massive air attacks or submarine action against UN ground or naval forces and his counteraction to UN air attacks is not sufficiently strong to interfere seriously with the effectiveness of UN operations.

CONTINGENCY III

- a. Negotiations fade out or adjourn without a clear break and with possibility existing for renewal at any time;
- b. Communists do not launch massive air attacks or submarine action;
- c. No evidence of increased major enemy ground or air build-up in Korea or Manchuria. (In other words, enemy appears to be attempting to bring about a situation of de facto ceasefire without agreement.)

2. Possible modifications of the above contingencies are foreseeable, but proper planning for the listed contingencies will encompass those modifications should they arise.

25X1A

VII

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

A. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Essential to the task of U. S. psychological operations is the seizure from the Kremlin of the psychological initiative. To accomplish such seizure we must not only anticipate events having psychological import but must also have a properly formulated psychological attack underway prior to the event.
2. Our hold on the initiative once gained must then be constantly strengthened by the manner in which it is exploited. The psychological attack must have well-defined objectives, must be of sufficient scope to embrace all foreseeable occurrences, and must be so designed as to allow ample room for maneuver under any expected circumstance or set of circumstances.

TOP SECRET

J-19-d

1. The psychological attack must not suppress all possible courses of action by the enemy, in order that these courses of action can be immediately countered, but also must create situations which will allow the enemy no choice but to move into psychologically disadvantageous positions.

2. In addition, in the case of the Korean armistice negotiations the psychological attack must be governed by certain special considerations. Constantly it must be borne in mind that any action taken prior to an actual breakdown must not jeopardize, and preferably should enhance, the possibility of achieving our real, immediate objectives, which, in the case of Korean armistice negotiations, are specifically:

- (1) To further the early and favorable completion of the negotiations;
- (2) To ensure that the United Nations and the United States are credited before the world for the successes obtained at the negotiations, and that the Soviet Union is blamed for all delays, obstacles, and failures.

3. In addition, any psychological action relevant to anticipated breakdown of armistice negotiations should be such as to assist in the principal U. S. international objective of building the moral, economic, and military strength of the free world and the attaining and holding of political unity among the nations not now under the domination of Soviet Communism.

25X1C

25X1X8

25X1C

Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010111-0

Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010111-0

3. Should the first situation above occur, it would be proof of insincerity on the part of the Communist leaders, and of U. S. charges of insincerity, duplicity, intransigence and aggressive intent on the part of Soviet-led Communism. Before the world the Soviet Union would be credited with failure of the armistice negotiations, political unity among nations opposing Soviet-led Communism would be strengthened, and the free world impetus toward the building of moral, economic, and military strength in the face of the Soviet-Communist menace would increase.

4. Should the second situation above develop, U. S. arguments would become stronger as the period without armistice lengthened. As in the case of the first situation, the insincerity, duplicity, intransigence and aggressive intent of Soviet-led Communism would be cited in placing responsibility for failure to arrive at an armistice settlement. As in the preceding case, also, political unity of the free world would be strengthened and the urge toward moral, economic, and military rearmament would increase.

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

TOP SECRET

J-19-d

X

PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION

25X1A2G

a. Planning and execution under Basic Plan [REDACTED] will be as indicated in assigned courses of action.

b. The department or agency having primary planning and execution responsibility for portions of this plan will coordinate planning and execution with departments and agencies which are assigned or accept supporting responsibilities.

c. In instances in which necessary concurrences between departments and agencies are not forthcoming, planning and execution problems will be referred to the Psychological Strategy Board for necessary coordination or procurement of higher level decision.

25X1A

d. Departments and agencies to whom Plan [REDACTED] assigns planning and execution responsibilities will submit special reports, as requested, to the Psychological Strategy Board.

Attention

25X1A2G

e. Special Contingency Guidance of 26 July 1951, [REDACTED], prepared by the Foreign Information Policy Staff, Department of State, will apply in the event a breakoff of negotiations occurs prior to completion of special plans developed under these objectives.

25X1A2G

f. Special Contingency Guidance of 27 July 1951, [REDACTED], prepared by the Foreign Information Policy Staff, Department of State, will apply in similar circumstances, if the UN Command is compelled by a Communist air offensive to launch air attacks on Chinese and Manchurian bases.

TOP SECRET